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Article

Why Police Should Protect Complainant
Autonomy
Randall K. Johnson†
INTRODUCTION
This Article describes a simple way to limit the high cost of
police misconduct, which is informed by background principles
from U.S. civil procedure.1 It does so by calling for the Chicago
Police Department (CPD) to better protect the complainant autonomy of injured citizens under the scaled-down process that is
used to resolve certain legal claims against officers.2 Complainant autonomy is an injured citizen’s right to control how its
claims are drafted and framed, even over the objection of a nominal plaintiff, regardless of whether such a right to do so is
clearly established or not.3
† Associate Professor of Law and Director of the Public Service Law Center, Mississippi College, School of Law. Special thanks to Dean Patricia Bennett
and the 2018-19 Mississippi College, School of Law’s Publications Grant Program. Additional thanks also are due to Professor Hannah Brenner, Professor
Deborah Challener, Professor Christophe Henkel, Professor John Infranca, Professor Angela Kupenda, Professor Antonia Layard, Professor Mark Modak-Truran, Professor Rachel Moran, Professor Michael Morley, Professor Evan Seamone, Professor Greg Shill, the editors of the Minnesota Law Review, and the
scholar-participants in the 2018-19 Local Government Law Works-In-Progress
Conference at Fordham University.
1. See generally J. Maria Glover, A Regulatory Theory of Legal Claims, 70
VAND. L. REV. 221, 223–24 (2017) (“Procedural law in the United States has
long sought to achieve three related, and often overlapping goals: (1) efficient
processes and institutions that achieve ‘substantive justice’ and deter violations
of law, (2) consistent and accurate outcomes based on the merits of parties’
claims, and (3) meaningful legal access for those who have claims.”).
2. See generally Martin H. Redish & Nathan D. Larsen, Class Actions, Litigant Autonomy, and the Foundations of Procedural Due Process, 95 CALIF. L.
REV. 1573, 1579 (2007) (“Autonomy . . . refers to the individual’s interest in having power to make choices about the protection of her own legally authorized
. . . rights.”).
3. The question of whether a right is clearly established, often, has a profound impact upon whether it is fully enforced. See, e.g., Michael T. Morley,
Public Law at the Cathedral: Enjoining the Government, 35 CARDOZO L. REV.
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The idea is that complainant autonomy supports the U.S.
“judicial system’s ‘jealous protection’ of an individual’s absolute
right to control his . . . claim.”4 Because of its protective function,
complainant autonomy has long served as a low-cost way of upholding “personal dignity principles, including the psychological
or cathartic values entailed in exercising individual autonomy.”5
As such, U.S. courts have “traditionally operated from the assumption that [certain] decisions are best made by the true property owner [of a claim], rather than by another person.”6
In light of the fact that complainant autonomy has traditionally been recognized as an important element of the U.S. legal
system, especially outside of the class action context,7 this Article seeks to bring attention to the CPD’s undermining of this
background rule of civil procedure.8 It does so by taking as its
primary unit of analysis the police complaint intake process in
Chicago (i.e. the administrative process by which a police com-

2453, 2468 (2014) (“Generally, for a right to be deemed clearly established [for
qualified immunity purposes], a court must have recognized or upheld the right
under closely related factual circumstances. Many circuits do not allow district
court rulings to be considered in determining whether a right was clearly established at the time of an official’s challenged conduct. Consequently, public officials in those jurisdictions typically may not be held liable for violating rights
that are recognized only in district court opinions. And by declining to appeal
adverse district court rulings, government litigants can prevent higher courts
from ruling on an issue, thereby preventing the law from becoming clearly established for qualified immunity purposes.”).
4. Linda S. Mullenix, Competing Values: Preserving Litigant Autonomy in
an Age of Collective Redress, 64 DEPAUL L. REV. 601, 615.
5. Id. at 614.
6. Id. at 615.
7. Limitations on complainant autonomy may not seem to be very important, but they have serious implications in theory and in practice. See generally Mark K. Moller, Separation of Powers and the Class Action, 95 NEB. L. REV.
366, 372–73 (2016) (“Thinking clearly about claim-control . . . requires carefully
breaking down the concept of a ‘claim’ into its [three] constituent parts. . . . One
is the protected interest that the right to relief protects—what might be termed
the ‘primary right.’ The second is the right to a remedy that corrects an infringement of that interest, or the ‘remedial right.’ The third is the right to sue to
obtain the remedy from the defendant—which I will call the ‘right of action’ or
‘claim.’”).
8. See City of Chicago, CHICAGO POLICE BOARD, ALLEGATIONS OF MISCONDUCT: A GUIDE TO THE COMPLAINT AND DISCIPLINARY PROCESS (Sept. 15, 2017),
https://www.cityofchicago.org/content/dam/city/depts/cpb/PoliceDiscipline/
AllegMiscond20170915.pdf. (“Whatever the nature of the [police] complaint,
[each allegation] is framed . . . in terms of an alleged violation of . . . the [CPD’s]
Rules of Conduct.”).
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plaint comes to be drafted, characterized, and submitted for investigation).9 This intake process deliberately impairs the prefiling rights of tort victims by limiting the grounds for raising
claims against police tortfeasors without adequate justification
(i.e. since all police misconduct claims must be drafted and characterized through the use of administrative law, as opposed to
civil law or criminal law).10
Any such limitation on complainant autonomy has especially negative impacts upon police tort victims, since there is a
reduced possibility that tortfeasors will be administratively
sanctioned under such circumstances. This reduced possibility of
sanctions arises from the fact that the CPD, and other pro-officer
groups, almost completely control the existing police complaint
process. One of the main reasons that the nominal-plaintiff CPD
should better protect the complainant autonomy of real parties
in interest-injured citizens, even at the risk of possibly interfering with a defendant-officer’s pre-filing interests, is that it may
be the only time that a real party in interest-injured citizen has
any realistic chance to set the administrative record straight.11
According to a recent publication by the City of Chicago,
which is called Allegations of Police Misconduct: A Guide to the
Complaint and Disciplinary Process, the CPD requires that
9. See Chicago Police Department, INSIDE THE CPD: THE COMPLAINT
(2018), https://home.chicagopolice.org/inside-the-cpd/the-complaint/ (“Complaints against [CPD] employees are made by [injured] citizens . . . . Anonymous
complaints are also accepted, although this sometimes reduces the ability to
gather all relevant facts upon which to make decisions about any given employee’s behavior. Not all complaints require a formal supervisory investigation.
However, a formal investigation is conducted in all cases where an allegation of
misconduct, if proven true, would constitute a violation of the department’s conduct rules.”).
10. As a general rule, and in numerous legal contexts, the U.S. legal system
asserts that procedural rules should not have an unjustifiably-negative impact
upon substantive rights. Compare Charles E. Clark, History, Systems and Functions of Pleading, 11 VA. L. REV. 517, 542 (1925) (“Pleading . . . [, which includes
various rules that govern the drafting and characterization of legal claims,] . . .
should perform the office only of aiding in the enforcement of substantive legal
relations. It should not limit the operation of the general law which defines
rights and duties, privileges and powers of individuals, but should aid in the
enforcement of such relations.”) With Daniel C. Hopkinson, The New Federal
Rules Of Civil Procedure As Compared With The Former Federal Equity Rules
And The Wisconsin Code, 23 MARQ. L. REV. 159, 160 (1939) (“It was not intended
that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure should affect any substantive rights
… The intention … was to provide a simple, unified system which would be
governed by a simple, brief body of rules.”)
11. See generally Moller, supra note 7, at 373 (describing circumstances in
which “the right of action is public, meaning enforced by public officials . . . .”).
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“[w]hatever the nature of the [police] complaint, [each allegation] is framed . . . in terms of an alleged violation of . . . the
[CPD’s] Rules of Conduct.”12 The implication is that tort victims
may frame police misconduct allegations against police tortfeasors solely under administrative law.13 Among the results is that
tort victims may be deprived of any way of holding police tortfeasors to account, due to an inability to call attention to closely
related claims under civil and criminal law, especially when considering it is difficult to assure accountability only using administrative law because tort victims often are deprived of real-time
updates once a complaint is submitted for CPD consideration.14
The CPD offers several excuses for its decision to undermine
complainant autonomy. These excuses assume that countervailing legal considerations, such as a need to protect the contractual
and constitutional rights of officers, justify the CPD’s failure to
properly draft and characterize claims that are raised in exactly
the way that is described by injured parties.15 It also assumes
that injured citizens may be forced to give up control over how
police complaints are drafted and framed, in order to protect the
pre-filing interests of officers, even if such rights do not exist.16
One result is that claims are strategically drafted and
framed by the CPD and pro-police regulators, often over the objection of injured citizens, so as to avoid imposing any sanctions
12. City of Chicago, supra note 8.
13. For example, when an officer intermeddles with the property of another
citizen, at least in cases wherein there is no assumption that the interference is
excused, the violation could be framed in terms of administrative law (i.e. as an
improper use of the police power), civil law (i.e. as a conversion of property), or
criminal law (i.e. as a theft).
14. See generally Jodi S. Cohen, Dan Hinkel, & Jennifer Smith-Roberts, In
Oversight of Chicago Police, IPRA Gives Victims False Sense of Justice, CHI.
TRIB. (Jun. 17, 2016), http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/watchdog/ct-chicago
-police-ipra-mediation-met-20160616-story.html (“A Tribune investigation of
nearly 700 complaints upheld by IPRA [which has preceded COPA as the primary regulator of police misconduct claims] found the agency routinely obscured
its findings [excluded many injured citizens from meaningfully participating in
subsequent investigations] and misled the public about how its investigations
played out, often giving victims of police misconduct a false sense that they had
prevailed.”).
15. See Adeshina Emmanuel, Chicago Police Contract Scrutinized in the
Aftermath of Laquan McDonald’s Death, CHI. REP. (Dec. 10, 2015), http://www
.chicagoreporter.com/chicago-police-contract-scrutinized-in-the-aftermath-of
-laquan-mcdonalds-death/ (“The Fraternal Order of Police contract with the city
shapes how Chicago handles police misconduct allegations, disciplines rankand-file officers, as well as when the city pays legal costs for police officers accused of wrongdoing.”).
16. Id.
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on officers. This strategic drafting and framing may not be done
in good faith nor in a relatively timely manner. Among the results is that crucial decisions about whether to investigate
claims, to bring charges, or to lay sanctions often rely on administrative records with less-than-true information.
That is why it is almost unheard of for a nominal plaintiff
(i.e. the CPD) to challenge how a real party in interest (i.e. the
injured citizen) drafts and characterizes allegations, especially
when it is done to protect the pre-filing interests of a named defendant (i.e. officers).17 Thus, as a threshold matter, my Article
rejects any such excuse for undermining complainant autonomy
under the CPD’s existing complaint intake process. It, instead,
follows the lead of other recent U.S. legal scholarship on public
sector accountability and crime deterrence18 by showing “that
police decision-making at the administrative level is as fateful
. . . as the … decisions . . . officers make during encounters.”19
This Article does so by pointing out that the act of requiring
police complaints to be exclusively framed in terms of administrative law, as opposed to under civil or criminal law, undermines complainant autonomy and redistributes legal authority
17. See Benjamin J. Conley, Will the Real Real Party in Interest Please
Stand Up?: Applying the Capacity to Sue Rule in Diversity Cases, 65 WASH. &
LEE L. REV. 675, 688 (2008) (finding that “Often, when a party is the real party
in interest [i.e. the true holder of a legal right] that party lacks the capacity to
bring suit. . . . Such a party needs a surrogate (other than his lawyer) to stand
in for him.”); Mexican Cent. Ry. Co. v. Eckman, 187 U.S. 429, 431 (1903) (describing the rights and obligations of a party that stands in as an agent for the
real party in interest, which is often referred to as a nominal plaintiff); see also
Conley, supra note 17, at 686 (explaining that “courts generally classify parties
to a lawsuit depending on the nature of the interest the party has in the outcome
of the suit [so, a party that is accused of violating the plaintiff’s right may be
classified as a defendant].”).
18. See, e.g., Rachel Moran, In Police We Trust, 62 VILL. L. REV. 953, 993
(2017) (“[This paper finds that] [i]t is long past time to hold police departments
accountable for misconduct. That is what this [article] aims to do: provide concrete suggestions for dismantling the system of deference that has long plagued
review of police misconduct complaints, and replacing it with a system that effectively responds to [police] complaints and holds officers accountable . . . .”).
19. Eric J. Miller, The Policing in America Symposium: Policing on Behalf
of the Community, CITY SQUARE: ONLINE J. FORDHAM URB. L. J. (Aug. 16, 2017),
http://urbanlawjournal.com/on-behalf-of-the-community-2/. Other recent legal
scholarship raises additional and different concerns. See, e.g., Kate Levine &
Stephen Rushin, Interrogation Parity, 2018 U. ILL. L. REV. 1685, 1687 (2018)
(“The current distributional inequity [in terms of how police tortfeasors and others are treated under the law] is problematic for several reasons, not least because it affords the most sophisticated suspects the most protection while leaving the most vulnerable suspects at the mercy of constitutional protections that
have been interpreted time and again to offer weak and limited protection.”).
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among the parties. As such, such an impairment may not be justified, particularly when the misconduct allegation (for example,
an allegation that the officer has taken a citizen’s property without an adequate justification) could have been framed as either
an administrative law violation (i.e. improper execution of a
search warrant), a civil law violation (i.e. as conversion), or a
criminal law violation (i.e. as a theft). One example of a case in
point is Elizondo v. U.S., which highlights the problems with this
approach.20
The nominal-plaintiff CPD’s undermining of complainant
autonomy may arise from an assumption that it has transferred
a property interest in police complaints to defendant-officers, despite the fact that this public information is likely to be owned
by real parties in interest-injured citizens in their individual capacity and as a member of the general public. Such a mistaken
belief may not be reasonable, as indicated by several recent U.S.
cases. Examples include: Fraternal Order of Police v. City of Chicago and Carpenter v. U.S., which both have been recently decided.21
It, therefore, stands to reason that the nominal plaintiffCPD should allow each real party in interest-injured citizen to
raise their claims against defendant-officers under any of the
available legal options (i.e. administrative, civil, or criminal
law). This modest change in policy is likely to have a host of tangible benefits. These benefits include dignitary, informational,
and efficiency gains for most interested parties. Specific examples include improvements in how the CPD and its officers are
viewed (dignitary gains), enhanced understandings about how

20. See United States Attorney’s Office, Northern District of Illinois, Federal Grand Jury Indicts Two Chicago Police Officers for Fraudulently Obtaining
Search Warrants and Stealing Evidence, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. NEWS (May 10,
2018), https://www.justice.gov/usao-ndil/pr/federal-grand-jury-indicts-two
-chicago-police-officers-fraudulently-obtaining-search (providing relevant information about the case, including the federal indictment for each officer).
21. See generally 2016 IL App (1st) 143884, 11. (“[This case holds that, as a
matter of law,] [a] citizen complaint, an officer’s date of appointment, the complaint category, the [police complaint] number, the incident date, the date the
complaint was closed, and a finding of unfounded do not constitute a disciplinary report, letter of reprimand, or other record of disciplinary action that [may
be exempt from disclosure under FOIA. The court also found that these data are
not exempt from disclosure under the Personnel Record Review Act nor the Public Labor Relations Act].”); 138 S.Ct. 2206, 2223 (2018) (holding that “the fact
that [cell phone location data] is gathered by a third party [which asserts that
it has acquired title to this information through common law contract] does not
make it any less deserving of [constitutional] protection.”).
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the law is applied (informational gains), and more useful interactions among the parties to a police complaint (efficiency gains).
This Article also notes that allowing each real party in interest-injured citizen to initially control how their complaints
about defendant-officers are framed does not mean that the nominal plaintiff-CPD must do any additional work. Better protecting complainant autonomy, in fact, could reduce the CPD’s datacollection and investigatory workload. As a result, the nominal
plaintiff-CPD could make better use of its scarce public sector
resources, especially if the CPD shares these complaints with
other police regulators with the authority to resolve them. Examples of these regulators could include the City of Chicago’s
Inspector General (i.e. for administrative law claims that are not
covered by the CPD’s rules and regulations), the City of Chicago’s Department of Law (i.e. for most civil law claims), and the
Cook County State’s Attorney (i.e. for criminal law claims).
A final benefit of letting a real party in interest-injured citizen decide which framing to use is that the nominal plaintiffCPD may be put on notice about the high cost of any bad police
work by a defendant-officer. The Article supplements this point
by marshalling economic arguments for reform, as opposed to
more familiar moral and ethical justifications, in its three additional parts (Parts I–III). Part I describes the applicable law for
police complaint intake. Part II contains this Article’s positive
analysis, which includes a detailed explanation of why reform is
needed. Part III has the Article’s normative analysis. The Conclusion summarizes this Article’s findings and conclusions.
I. APPLICABLE LAW
In Chicago, tort victims have a legal right to raise administrative claims against police tortfeasors under the CPD’s existing police complaint intake process.22 This right is acknowledged
by many statutory, decisional and administrative law sources.23
A recent publication, Allegations of Misconduct: A Guide To The
Complaint And Disciplinary Process, even expressly-states that:
[The Civilian Office of Police Accountability (COPA)], an independent
22. See, e.g., Chicago Police Board, POLICE DISCIPLINE (2018), https://www
.cityofchicago.org/city/en/depts/cpb/provdrs/police_discipline.html (“The Civilian Office of Police Accountability (COPA), the Police Department, and the Police Board have different roles. The responsibility to receive complaints of alleged misconduct by Chicago police officers rests with COPA. Depending on the
nature of the allegations, either COPA or the Police Department’s Bureau of
Internal Affairs [(the “BIA”)] will investigate.”).
23. See, e.g., CHICAGO POLICE DEPARTMENT, supra note 9.
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City [of Chicago administrative] agency, is responsible for receiving all
complaints of misconduct made against members of the Police Department. . . . Whatever the nature of the [police] complaint, it is framed
. . . in terms of an alleged violation of one or more of the Police Department’s Rules of Conduct. . . . Detailed information on the investigative
process . . . is available [online] at www.ChicagoCOPA.org.24

Within this context, it is well-established that:
The intake process begins once COPA receives complaints from residents or incident notifications from the Chicago Police Department
(CPD), and then cases are sorted and classified based on which investigative body will investigate the incident [as determined by how each
specific allegation of police misconduct has been framed in a police complaint]. . . . COPA investigates allegations of biased-based verbal
abuse, coercion, death or serious bodily injury in custody, domestic violence, excessive force, improper search and seizure, firearm discharge,
taser discharge that results in death or serious bodily injury, pattern
or practices of misconduct, [and] unlawful denial of access to counsel.
CPD’s Bureau of Internal Affairs investigates all other complaints of
police misconduct including but not limited to criminal misconduct, operational violations, theft of money or property, planting of drugs, substance abuse, residency violations and medical roll abuses [that officers
may have committed].25

Any valid police complaint requires a good-faith and relatively-timely filing by an injured citizen or the CPD.26 Once these
initial requirements are met, and an investigation is undertaken,27 a recommendation may be made about whether to pursue sanctions.28 Every recommendation for sanctions requires
on-the-record findings.29 Possible sanctions include a suspension
or discharge.30
Each potential sanction must be submitted to, and later
signed-off on by, the Chicago Police Superintendent.31 Levied
sanctions may be challenged or appealed, in a number of different ways, due to the enhanced protections given to officers.32

24. City of Chicago, supra note 8.
25. Civilian Office Of Police Accountability, INVESTIGATIVE PROCESS: STEP
1, INTAKE AND CLASSIFICATION PROCESS (2018), https://www.chicagocopa.org/
investigations/investigative-process/.
26. See City of Chicago, supra note 8.
27. Id. at 1.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 1–2.
30. Id. at 2.
31. Id. at 1.
32. E.g. Moran, supra note 18, at 978 (“Chicago’s collective bargaining
agreement provides that, when the investigating agency possesses video or audio evidence of a misconduct incident, an officer cannot be charged with making
a false statement unless the officer is first given an opportunity to review the

122

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW HEADNOTES [103:114

Other appellate options also are available, which may be used to
overturn sanctions because most complainants are intentionally-excluded from participating in the post-filing components of
the process (i.e. investigations and sanctions).33
As a result, it should be no surprise that police complaint
data may be subject to manipulation at the time of intake, during
investigations and after a final determination.34 For example, recent scholarship indicates most complaints are discounted or under-investigated.35 But, even in the rare event that a police complaint is taken seriously and fully-investigated by regulators,
less than three (3) percent of the allegations raised by citizens
have been upheld in recent years.36
This lack of accountability has real-world implications, as it
has been found that “most of the police misconduct lawsuits that
led to settlements or verdicts . . . were based . . . on … complaints
that were never investigated … [by regulators].”37 One possible
explanation for this failure-to-investigate is that the CPD, albeit
indirectly, shapes the entire police complaint process. The CPD

evidence, and subsequently given an opportunity to clarify or amend his statement if desired”).
33. See Jennifer Smith Richards and Jodi S. Cohen, Secretive Appeals Process Quietly Reducing Punishment For Cops After Findings Of Misconduct, CHICAGO TRIBUNE (Dec. 13, 2017), http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/watchdog/
ct-chicago-police-grievance-cases-met-20171213-story.html (“In the first examination of its kind, the Chicago Tribune and ProPublica Illinois found that 85
percent of disciplinary cases handled thorough the Chicago Police Department’s
grievance process since 2010 led to officers receiving shorter suspensions or, in
… cases, having … punishments overturned entirely … [without giving notice
to tort victims].”).
34. See Rachel Moran, Contesting Police Credibility, 93 WASH. L. REV.
1339, 1366 (2018) (noting that police complaint processes “[are] often biased—
implicitly or, not uncommonly, overtly—in favor of the officers, and conducted
with the intent to justify the officers’ behavior.”).
35. See, e.g., Shane Shifflett et al., Police Abuse Complaints By Black Chicagoans Dismissed Nearly 99 Percent Of The Time, THE HUFFINGTON POST
(Dec. 7, 2015), http://data.huffingtonpost.com/2015/12/chicago-officer
-misconduct-allegations (“Overall, [COPA’s immediate predecessor, the Independent Police Review Authority (IPRA)] sustained just 2.6 percent of all 29,000
complaints. Nationally, between 6 and 20 percent of citizen-initiated complaints
are sustained . . . .”).
36. Id.
37. See Brentin Mock, Chicago Cops, Unaccountable by Design, CITYLAB
(Jan. 24, 2017), https://www.citylab.com/equity/2017/01/chicago-police
-accountability/513791/ (explaining that regulators “can flat-out reject any complaint involving a police officer accused of handcuffing someone too tightly, or
who aggressively tackles someone during an arrest.”).
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does so by exploiting conflicts of interest,38 the behavioral economic biases of police regulators39 and its own path dependency.40 Thus, as evidenced by a host of recent studies, tort victims have almost no chance of holding any police tortfeasors to
38. See Chip Mitchell, Who Polices The Police? In Chicago, It’s Increasingly
Ex-Cops, WBEZ NEWS (Dec. 5, 2014), https://www.wbez.org/shows/wbez-news/
who-polices-the-police-in-chicago-its-increasingly-ex-cops/fbeca316-8b2a-4ef2
-beb1-d07f8b6e3bef (“[A] WBEZ investigation raises questions about just how
independent the agency is. City records obtained through a Freedom of Information Act request show that IPRA’s management now includes six former
cops—officials who have spent most of their career in sworn law enforcement.
Those include the agency’s top three leaders. . . . ‘[One result is that police complaints] may be seen not through the eyes of the citizen but through the eyes of
a police officer,’ said Paula Tillman, a former IPRA investigative supervisor who
was a Chicago cop herself in the 1970s and 1980s. ‘The investigations can be
engineered so that they have a tilt toward law enforcement and not what the
citizen is trying to say.’”). But see Miles Bryan, Expert: Police Board Decision in
Dakota Bright Shooting Is ‘Due Process Run Amok,’ WBEZ NEWS (Oct. 15,
2018), https://www.wbez.org/shows/wbez-news/chicago-police-board-often-sides
-with-officers/bacd6ad0-0088-49ba-825b-fc20aded2807 (“The Chicago Police
Board regularly overturns the findings of [a final misconduct] investigation and
. . . filing for dismissal by the police superintendent. Records indicate that between 2005 and 2015, the board voted about 58 percent of the time to allow an
officer to keep his or her job even though the police superintendent was seeking
to fire them. The board either found the officer not guilty or reduced the punishment.”). Such problems, however, are not the sole province of the CPD. See,
e.g., Christina Hall, Toledo Police Promotion Ceremony Has Family Feeling, TOLEDO BLADE (Jan. 23, 2004), http://www.toledoblade.com/local/2004/01/23/
Toledo-police-promotion-ceremony-has-family-feeling.html (describing how Toledo Police Department Captain Wes Bombrys, Captain Edward Bombrys, Sr.,
Sergeant Mike Bombrys and Sergeant Matthew Bombrys are close relatives of
former Internal Affairs Investigator and current Special Investigations Bureau
Captain Edward Bombrys, Jr., who was previously-tasked with investigating
such colleagues).
39. See Matthew Bishop, Behavioral Economics, ECONOMICS: AN A TO Z
GUIDE (2018), https://www.economist.com/economics-a-to-z. (explaining that
behavioral economics is a “branch of economics that concentrates up explaining
the decisions people make in practice, especially when these conflict with what
conventional economic theory predicts they will do.”). See, e.g., RoNeisha Mullen, Perrysburg Township Settles with Fired Chief, TOLEDO BLADE (Jul. 25,
2015), http://www.toledoblade.com/Police-Fire/2015/07/25/Perrysburg
-Township-settles-with-fired-chief.html (describing why former Toledo Police
Officer and Perrysburg Township Deputy Police Chief Michael Gilmore was dismissed from his leadership position with a suburban law enforcement agency,
but still received a monetary settlement).
40. See Bishop, supra note 39 (“Path dependency refers to the way in which
apparently insignificant events and choices can have huge consequences for the
development of a market or an economy.”). See, e.g., Nick Dutton, Toledo Cops
Plead No Contest To Drug And Alcohol Charges, CBS 11 WTOL.COM (Dec. 14,
2009), http://m.wtol.com/toledonewsnow/pm_/contentdetail.htm?contentguid=
od:yXNW1E0T (describing how Toledo Police Department Officers, including
Curtis Jewell, do not deny engaging in serious wrongdoing yet are retained).
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account under the existing CPD complaint process: especially if
less-than-true information is added to the administrative record.41
The CPD, therefore, does not feel any need to fully-protect
the rights of tort victims since their complaints about police tortfeasors are unlikely to be vindicated.42 One such example is how
the CPD deals with complainant autonomy, which is a background rule of U.S. civil procedure that is meant to assure that
tort victims maintain control over their legal claims. The CPD
does not fully-protect, nor even seem to recognize, this particular
right. Especially as it pertains to the ability to initially control
how an injured citizen’s claims are framed under the CPD’s complaint process.
This point is evidenced by the fact that “[w]hatever the nature of the [police] complaint, it is framed . . . in terms of an alleged violation of . . . the . . . [CPD’s] Rules of Conduct.”43 Such a
required framing has important implications for distributional
fairness, especially in terms of the type, quality and quantity of
information that may be introduced into the administrative record. By definition, “distributional fairness . . . depends on the
amount of in-kind goods … [or services, which are provided to]
citizens … [and is a valid way to measure the validity of public
policies].”44
41. See Shifflett, supra note 35. Unfortunately, such cynicism is not limited
to the employees of U.S. law enforcement agencies. See generally Chris Fusco,
Absentee-Ballot Handling Got City Election Board Supervisor Fired, CHICAGO
SUN-TIMES, (June 24, 2016), https://chicago.suntimes.com/politics/absentee
-ballot-handling-got-city-election-board-supervisor-fired/ (“Jim Allen, a [Chicago Board of Election Commissioners (CBEC)] spokesman, declined to comment about [the firing of Sheri M.] Bowen and also about whether disciplinary
action might have been taken against other employees [such as Principal Clerk
and Vote By Mail Supervisor Steven Cieslicki] because of the absentee-ballot
problems [that caused an untold number of Chicago-area voters to be disenfranchised].”).
42. See Shifflett, supra note 35.
43. City of Chicago, supra note 8, at 1.
44. Randall K. Johnson, Uniform Enforcement or Personalized Law? A Preliminary Analysis of Parking Ticket Appeals in Chicago, 93 IND. L.J. SUPP. 34,
39 n.27 (2018) (using percentage analysis to find out how parking tickets, and
other related matters, are distributed by zip code in Chicago.). The author’s past
work with on parking tickets, and parking ticket appeals, has inspired a host of
follow-up research in Chicago. See WOODSTOCK INSTITUTE, The Debt Spiral:
How Chicago’s Vehicle Ticketing Practices Unfairly Burden Low-Income and
Minority Communities (Jun. 21, 2018), http://woodstockinst.org/wp-content/
uploads/2018/06/The-Debt-Spiral-How-Chicagos-Vehicle-Ticketing-PracticesUnfairly-Burden-Low-Income-and-Minority-Communities-June-2018.pdf (using percentage analysis to examine parking tickets, and other related matters,
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In other words, the CPD has created an alternate approach
to drafting and characterizing police complaints in Chicago. This
alternate approach is used to undermine the traditional goals of
the U.S. legal system. These goals include “(1) efficient processes
and institutions that achieve ‘substantive justice’ and deter violations of law, (2) consistent and accurate outcomes based on the
merits of parties’ claims, and (3) meaningful legal access for
those who have claims for relief.”45
For an illustration of how this alternate approach operates
in practice, this Article looks at U.S. v. Elizondo.46 This federal
case arose from the fact that two CPD officers were criminallycharged with injuring citizens, mostly by taking their personal
property, after being accused of the very same behavior in a host
of previously-ignored complaints.47 The alleged police misconduct in Elizondo, at least as it was described in complaints that
predated the litigation, could be framed as either a violation of
the administrative law (i.e. an improper execution of a search
warrant), a violation of the civil law (i.e. as conversion) or a violation of the criminal law (i.e. as theft).48
As stated previously, limiting complainant autonomy deprives a real party in interest-injured citizen of a chance to be
made whole for violations of their dignitary interests by defendant-officers. This limitation on complainant autonomy also deprives defendant-officers, such as the police tortfeasors in Elizondo, of useful information about how their misconduct drives
up the cost of police work in Chicago. Lastly, it deprives the nominal plaintiff-CPD of the benefits of potential efficiency gains by
shielding defendant-officers from the valid critiques that are
are distributed in Chicago). This follow-up work has garnered attention from
local, state, national, and international publications and substantiated my preliminary research findings about parking tickets, parking ticket appeals and
win rates on appeal. See, e.g., Melissa Sanchez & Sandhya Kambhampati, How
Chicago Ticket Debt Sends Black Motorists into Bankruptcy, PROPUBLICA ILLINOIS (Feb. 27, 2018), https://feastures.propublica.org/driven-into-debt-/chicago
-ticket-debt-bankrupcy (describing how excessive ticketing has especially-severe consequences for disadvantaged groups).
45. Glover, supra note 1, at 223–24.
46. See United States Attorney’s Office, supra note 20.
47. See generally Sam Charles et al., Lawsuits, Citizen Complaints Dog 2
CPD Cops Charged With Stealing Cash, Drugs, CHICAGO SUN-TIMES (May 10,
2018), https://chicago.suntimes.com/crime/2-cpd-cops-charged-with-stealing
-cash-drugs-sharing-proceeds-with-snitches/ (“‘Two Chicago Police officers
charged with stealing cash and drugs . . . after submitting false affidavits to
judges . . . have been the subjects of dozens of misconduct complaints over the
years. [Nearly none of these complaints were sustained.]”).
48. Id.
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raised by real party in interest-injured parties, which too often
leads to subsequent litigation with or by the CPD.
Within this context, better protection of complainant autonomy could limit the cost of any bad police work that is not
properly-deterred by the threat of conventional sanctions.49 As
this author implied in a 2013 article, which explained why the
third-party data that is contained within every police complaint
works so well, this modest reform may do so for three reasons:
First, it may provide better and more complete information about the
underlying causes of misconduct. Second, [better protection of complainant autonomy] … may be useful for modeling actual police behavior. Lastly, [this modest reform] … may help … [police] … departments
… [to] … overcome heuristic biases and other informational failures.50

Therefore, in order to provide a measure of guidance to U.S.
administrative agencies that purport to give its officers a property interest in public goods or services, this Article outlines several ways to better protect complainant autonomy.51 It does so,
49. It is likely that the CPD has some interest in detecting and deterring
police tortfeasors, if only to limit its liability. See generally Hazel Glenn Beh,
Municipal Liability For Failure To Investigate Citizen Complaints Against Police, XXV FORDHAM URB. L.J. 209, 210 (1998) (“Federal courts have signaled
that a municipality must systematically address citizen complaints as a part of
its responsibility to manage and supervise its police officers.”). This liability
may arise in a variety of ways. See generally Rachel A. Harmon, Legal Remedies
for Police Misconduct, ACADEMY FOR JUSTICE: A REPORT ON SCHOLARSHIP AND
CRIMINAL JUSTICE REFORM (ERIK LUNA ED., 2017) 28 (2017) (“A variety of legal
remedies for constitutional violations by police officers, including the exclusionary rule, civil suits for damages or reform, and criminal prosecution, exist to
ensure that officers follow the law and provide redress when they do not.”) According to several recent studies, limitation of liability could be enhanced by
placing an increased focus on the misconduct allegations that are raised in all
police complaints. See, e.g., Kyle Rozema & Max Schanzenbach, Good Cop, Bad
Cop: Using Civilian Allegations To Predict Police Misconduct, AMER. ECON. J.
(forthcoming) (manuscript at 1–2) (“This article assesses the potential for civilian allegations to predict police officer misconduct using recently released data
on over 50,000 civilian allegations of police officer misconduct in Chicago.”).
50. Randall K. Johnson, Why Police Learn from Third-Party Data, 3 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. ONLINE 1, 5 (Supp. 2013), http://wakeforestlawreview.com/
2013/01/why-police-learn-from-third-party-data/ (applying a ratio-based approach to determine the nature of the relationship between third-party data
collection and published §1983 cases.).
51. Cf. Alisa Chang, Ticket-Fixing Officers Say They Just Followed Supervisors’ Example, WNYC NEWS (Nov. 4, 2011), https://www.wnyc.org/story/
168571-blog-ticket-fixing-officers-say-they-just-followed-supervisors-example/
(“As 11 New York City police officers face ticket-fixing charges in the Bronx, the
largest police union in the city — the Patrolmen’s Benevolent Association — has
angrily stuck to one position: Ticket-fixing has been condoned for decades as
part of the “NYPD culture” . . . [In support of this position, some members of the
union] . . . point out . . . [that] . . . the NYPD’s own Patrol Guide allows for the
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specifically, by accounting for previously-ignored issues such as
conflicts of interest, behavioral economic biases and path dependency. The goal is to limit hidden market failures, which
arise when “a market left to itself does not allocate resources efficiently,” so that these agencies better account for the high cost
of bad public service work.52 An example of how agencies could
overcome these issues, even in cases where a host jurisdiction is
not very economically-efficient, is described in the rest of this
Article.
As such, the Article does not seek to challenge the nominal
plaintiff-CPD’s right to place jurisdictional limits upon its administrative complaint processes. Nor does it assume, in cases
where complainant autonomy is not fully-protected in administrative proceedings, that a real party in interest-injured citizen
has no other viable way to hold a defendant-police officer to account. This Article, instead, questions the wisdom of a nominal
plaintiff-CPD’s decision to limit the type, quality and quantity of
information that may be produced by a real party in interestinjured citizen while too often allowing defendant-officers to intentionally add less-than-true information to the public record.
II. POSITIVE ANALYSIS
Serious economic issues have plagued Chicago, especially in
recent years, which made it increasingly difficult for this U.S.
city to provide the same amount of public goods and services as
similarly situated municipalities.53 These economic issues arose
from excessive spending on the CPD, a failure to adequately fund
the municipality’s public pension obligations, and half-hearted
attempts to capture valid parking ticket fines and other potential own-source revenues.54 This inefficient approach to admin-

voiding of tickets . . . [But, upon closer inspection, the union’s position is untenable because,] . . . according to the rules . . . [in the Patrol Guide, any ‘voiding
privilege’] . . . is only for tickets that were first issued “in error” . . . other kinds
of ticket-fixing were never acceptable … [under the letter nor the spirit of the
law] … such as defacing a ticket by writing false information, or removing a
ticket from the pile.”).
52. See Bishop, supra note 39.
53. See, e.g., Chi. Tribune Editorial Bd., How Chicago Debt Exploded, CHICAGO TRIBUNE, Nov. 17, 2013, http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/opinion/
plan/ct-edit-chicago-taxpayers-edit-1117-20131117_1_pension-money-chicago
-debt-police-and-fire-funds-story.html (“Decades of abuse and neglect by its political class leave Chicago with insufficient funds for necessities, let alone for
smart extras.”).
54. Id. (“The most devastating sin in Chicago was arrogance—mayors and
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istration led to even worse outcomes during the Great Recession.55
The Great Recession, which began in 2007 and led to additional reductions in the quality and quantity of the city’s public
goods and services, forced Chicago to become more economically
efficient.56 For example, the city reduced its annual spending by
implementing new cost controls.57 It also created a plan to meet
its public pension obligations.58 Lastly, Chicago improved its revenue collection by increasing local taxes, collecting on its debts
and ensuring laws are better enforced.59
One way for Chicago to become even more economically efficient, at least in the absence of additional legislative action, is to
avoid unnecessary CPD litigation.60 CPD litigation is too often
unnecessary because it arises from predictable and systematic
police errors.61 Among the worst examples of these police errors
involve deliberate under-enforcement of the law, as exemplified
aldermen sure they could see the city’s economic future and, paradoxically,
doubting that it ever could implode.”).
55. Id. (“[The damage caused by the Great Recession] . . . is deep and prolonged because [Chicago] City Hall had spent, borrowed and promised so much
that it couldn’t tolerate any revenue dips.”).
56. See, e.g., Fran Spielman, Emanuel’s 2017 Budget Address: “Chicago Is
Back on Solid Ground”, CHICAGO SUN-TIMES (Oct. 11, 2016), http://chicago
.suntimes.com/news/emanuels-2017-budget-address-chicago-is-back-on-solid
-ground/ (“Chicago has regained its financial footing because city officials made
some tough decisions, Mayor Rahm Emanuel said Tuesday in his 2017 budget
address.”).
57. Id. (“Under the category titled ‘improved fiscal management,’ Emanuel
anticipates generating $86.4 million by ‘sweeping aging revenue accounts, TIF
reform’ and through investment reforms . . . .”).
58. Id. (“The Chicago Sun-Times reported last week that Emanuel plans
$30 million in ‘targeted’ taxes[,] fines and fees, even as it closes ‘loopholes’ and
holds the line on property, sales, and gasoline taxes.”). Other efficiency-enhancing reforms, which include a pension reform option that was originally recommended by this author but only recently-taken up also may be available.
59. Id. (“The mayor’s budget assumes $148 million in revenue growth,
driven by increases in sales, personal property lease tax and city sticker fees.”).
60. See, e.g., Heather Kerrigan, Chicago’s Police Misconduct Cases Go to
Court, GOVERNING (Feb. 2011), http://www.governing.com/topics/public-justice
-safety/Chicagos-Police-Misconduct-Cases-Go-to-Court.html (“Chicago found a
somewhat counterintuitive way to save money and save face – by taking every
single police misconduct case to court … [including textbook examples of civil
rights violations].”).
61. See generally Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein & Richard Thaler, A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STANFORD L. REV. 1471, 1477-8
(explaining that “someone using . . . a rule of thumb may be behaving rationally
in the sense of economizing on thinking time, but such a person will nonetheless
make forecasts that are different from those that emerge from the standard rational-choice model.”).
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by how CPD officers refused to address the valid complaints of
Che “Rhymefest” Smith in 2016.62
The failure to address this bad police work, combined with
Illinois’ abolition of the public duty doctrine,63 caused Chicago to
become the undisputed leader in misconduct costs.64 According
to its own records, this city paid “$936 million in [CPD] settlements, judgments and legal expenses” from 2010 to 2016.65 This
translates into $156 million in annual costs, which is significantly than what similarly situated U.S. cities paid over the
same six-year (6) timeframe.66
Other under-enforcement issues arose directly from the
CPD’s mistaken beliefs. For example, the CPD inexplicably believes that it has some property interest in police complaints (i.e.
administrative records, which contain allegations of officer
wrongdoing).67 This belief does not seem reasonable, especially
after a close examination of the law.68 It is well established that
62. See Nereida Moreno et al., Rhymefest Posts Video of Trying to Report
Crime, Gets Apology from Police, CHICAGO TRIBUNE (Aug. 29, 2016), www.chicagotribune.com/news/local/breaking/ct-rhymefest-robbery-report-met20160827-story,amp.html (“Chicago rapper . . . Rhymefest took to Twitter to say
he was not only robbed . . . but also that he was treated ‘disgustingly’ by officers
when [Rhymefest] tried to report the crime [and subsequent police misconduct].”). Unfortunately, this under-enforcement by officers may not be unintentional. See Simone Weichselbaum, The Police Laboratory, TIME (2018), http://
time.com/chicago-police-3/ (quoting “Sergeant James Ade, who runs Chicago’s
police sergeant’s union. ‘If we don’t do anything, then we can’t get hammered.’”).
63. The public duty doctrine previously immunized government officials
that failed to fully-protect members of the general public, sometimes even without adequate justification. See Coleman v. E. Joliet Fire Prot. Dist., 46 N.E.3d
741, 758 (holding that the Illinois Supreme Court has chosen to “abolish the
public duty rule and its special duty exception.”).
64. See, e.g., Steve Daniels, How Chicago’s Financing of Police Misconduct
Payouts Adds Hundreds of Millions to the Tab, CRAIN’S CHICAGO BUSINESS (Jul.
6, 2018), http://www.chicagobusiness.com/article/20180706/ISSUE01/
180709939/how-chicagos-financing-of-police-misconduct-payouts-adds
-hundreds-of-millions-to-the-tab (explaining why “there’s little doubt Chicago
holds the dubious distinction as the nation’s top spender on police misconduct.”).
65. Daniels, supra note 64 (“From 2010 through 2016, the city financed
$486 million of the $936 million in settlements, judgments and legal expenses
over that time . . . with bonds.”).
66. See Daniels, supra note 64 (describing how Chicago paid $936 million
in total costs, over a six-year period, and the fact that “Los Angeles’ debt to
finance police-related settlements is a pittance compared to Chicago’s.”).
67. See Emmanuel, supra note 15 (explaining that a recent collective bargaining agreement, which was agreed to by the City of Chicago, the CPD and
police unions purports to give officers a property interest in police complaints).
68. See generally Eugene Volokh, Police Officers Have No Constitutional
‘Right of Privacy’ in Records of Their Official Misconduct, THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Aug. 5, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh
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“the people are the … [true] … owners, … shareholders . . . [and]
. . . custodians of the authority that temporarily vests with . . .
public officials.”69 Therefore, in the absence of a change to this
rule, it stands to reason that members of the general public are
the owners of public goods and services.70
Recent litigation has begun to challenge the CPD’s mistaken
beliefs about who owns public goods and services,71 which may
arise from the fact that U.S. courts defer to police in most legal
situations.72 Thus, in light of the unsettled nature of the law,73
-conspiracy/wp/2014/08/05/police-officers-have-no-constitutional-right-of-privacy-in-records-of-their-official-misconduct/?utm_term=.c542604039a4 (explaining that it “[s]hould be pretty obvious [that police have no constitutional
right to conceal official misconduct that is documented,] . . . but it had to be
litigated . . . [in] Chasnoff v. Mokwa (Mo. Cir. Ct. June 11, 2014).”).
69. David H. Hoffman & Juliet S. Sorensen, PUBLIC CORRUPTION AND THE
LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 2 (2017).
70. Officers have tried to change the default rule for police complaints, often with varying degrees of success, through state and local-level collective bargaining agreements. See, e.g., Bainbridge Island Police Guild v. City of
Puyallup, 259 P.3d 190, 208 (Wash. 2011) (holding that “where some investigative records have already been disclosed and information connecting the individual officer to unsubstantiated allegations has already been made public, further disclosure of the investigative records in any form will repeat the
identification of the officer and violate the officer’s right to privacy.”).
71. See Watkins v. McCarthy, 980 N.E.2d 733, 745 (Ill. App. 1st Dist. 2012)
(holding “that the requested [police complaint data, i.e. complaint register files
(or CRs),] in their entirety, including [any police] complaints found to be without
merit, are not exempt [from disclosure under the Illinois Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), although these individual-level data should be redacted to
remove any information in these public records that fall under a valid FOIA
exemption]”); see Kalven v. City of Chicago, 7 N.E.3d 741, 749 (Ill. App. 1st Dist.
2014) (holding that the requested public records, i.e. individual-level police complaint data (CRs) and group-level police complaint data (repeater lists of officers
with a certain number of complaints (RLs), are not exempt from disclosure under the Illinois FOIA and that the CPD has the burden of proving that any information in these public records should be redacted under a valid FOIA exemption); See Fraternal Order of Police v. City of Chicago, 59 N.E.3d 96, 108 (Ill.
App. 1st Dist. 2016) (holding that, as a matter of law, “a citizen complaint, an
officer’s date of appointment, the complaint category, the [police complaint]
number, the incident date, the date the complaint was closed, and a finding of
unfounded do not constitute a disciplinary report, letter of reprimand, or other
record of disciplinary action that [may be exempt from disclosure under FOIA].”)
The court also found that these data are not exempt from disclosure under the
Personnel Record Review Act nor its Public Labor Relations Act. Id.
72. See, e.g., United States v. Blagojevich, 612 F.3d 558 (7th Cir. 2015)
(finding that “Cleveland v. United States, 531 U.S. 12 (2000) holds that state
and municipal licenses, and similar documents, are not ‘property’ in the hands
of a public agency” nor in the hands its public employees.).
73. See generally Moller, supra note 7, at 375–76 (explaining that “[c]onsistent with this property-like conception of remedies, the law of proper parties
identified, although with exceptions, the party in interest entitled to the remedy
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it is important to determine who owns police complaints.74 A recent Illinois case that provides useful insights, especially when
it is properly-contextualized and narrowly-framed, is Fraternal
Order of Police v. City of Chicago.75
Fraternal Order, which interpreted 5 ILCS 140/7(1)(C)
among other Illinois statutes, shined a harsh light on the CPD’s
mistaken beliefs.76 It did so by strongly-implying, but never
quite declaring, that police complaints cannot be owned by the
CPD.77 One potential implication is that the CPD holds this information in trust for members of the general public, in keeping
with the public trust doctrine, and cannot transfer title to its officers.78 Thus, even if such a transfer is the subject matter of an
otherwise valid contract, it may not be permitted under the applicable law.
as the only person with standing to enforce the [legal] claim.”).
74. See generally Sergio J. Campos, Do Claims About Claims To Claims
Matter?, JOTWELL (Mar. 23, 2017), http://courtslaw.jotwell.com/do-claims
-about-claims-to-claims-matter/ (reviewing J. Maria Glover, A Regulatory Theory of Legal Claims, 70 VAND. L. REV. 221 (2017)) (“Civil procedure scholars
continue to debate whether the legal claim is a party’s ‘property,’ as opposed to
an aspect of procedure.”).
75. See Fraternal Order of Police v. City of Chicago, 59 N.E.3d 96, 108 (Ill.
App. 1st Dist. 2016) (finding that police complaint files “are not personnel files
in any sense because they pertain to the ‘initiation, investigation, and resolution
of complaints of misconduct.’”). Other U.S. state-law cases, which deal with different issues presented, also could serve as a launching point for innovative
work on police complaints. Examples include Denver Policemen’s Protective
Ass’n v. Lichtenstein, 660 F. 2d 432, 436–37 (10th Cir. 1981) (noting that police
misconduct data, even when they are contained within the personnel file of an
officer, are analogous to a citizen’s criminal history data and thus discoverable
under Colorado state law).
76. Compare 5 ILL. COMP. STAT. 140/7(1)(C) (2012) (finding that “The disclosure of information that bears on the public duties of public employees and
officials shall not be considered an invasion of personal privacy.”), with Fraternal Order of Police v. City of Chicago, 59 N.E.3d 96, 106 (Ill. App. 1st Dist. 2016)
(finding that “there was no legal basis for the circuit court to enjoin defendants
from releasing the requested records in order to allow plaintiff to pursue a legally-unenforceable remedy.”).
77. Id. at 104 (finding that the “Court should deny injunctive relief where
it will cause serious harm to the [general] public without a corresponding great
advantage to the movant [police union].”).
78. See Illinois Central R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 435 (1892) (holding
that “it is the settled law of this country that the ownership of and dominion
and sovereignty over lands covered by tide waters, within the limits of the several states, belong to the respective states within which they are found with the
consequent right of use or dispose of any portion thereof, when that can be done
without substantial impairment of the interest of the public in the waters, and
subject always to the paramount right of congress to control their navigation in
so far as may be necessary for the regulation of commerce with foreign nations
and among the states.”)
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A similar point has been made, albeit in an entirely different
policing context, in Carpenter v. United States.79 Carpenter held
that “the fact that [public] information is gathered by a third
party,” which asserts that it has acquired marketable title to this
property under a valid common law contract, “does not make it
any less deserving of [constitutional] protection.”80 The implication is that when the CPD attempts to transfer any ownership
interest in public information to third-parties (such an individual officer or an organization that represents groups of officers),
and it holds title in public trust or as described in Carpenter,
courts should not allow a complete transfer of property rights.81
This analysis indicates that Fraternal Order was properlydecided, although it does not directly answer the question of who
is the owner of police complaints.82 Specifically, the case held:
[A]s a matter of law, neither the [Illinois] Review Act nor the pendency
of the parties’ arbitrations under [the CPD-union contract] interfere
with [Chicago’s] obligations to [preserve and to] disclose the requested
[police complaints] . . . under the [Illinois Freedom of Information Act],
where, as here, no exemptions apply. [Therefore,] [t]he preliminary injunctions must be vacated because they prevent [Chicago] from complying with the disclosure requirements … [under state law].83

Since Fraternal Order also does not directly address related
claim-control questions, there is still additional work to be
done.84 In an attempt to avoid future litigation, the CPD could
take the initiative and put its officers on notice that complainant
79. See generally Chris Odinet, Data as Property at the Supreme Court (Updated), PROPERTYPROFBLOG (Jun. 22, 2018), http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/
property/2018/06/data-as-property-at-the-supreme-court.html (“The majority
[in Carpenter v. United States] is basically saying that even though the agreement between the cell phone provider and the customer says that the information collected about user location belongs to the provider, this doesn’t necessarily mean that the customer has no privacy interest.”).
80. Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2223 (2018).
81. Cf. Odinet, supra note 79.
82. See, e.g., Fraternal Order of Police v. City of Chicago, 2016 IL App (1st)
143884, ¶ 31–32 (finding that the “remedy [ the police union] seeks . . . is to have
the arbitrators order the city to ‘comply with Section 8.4 by destroying records
more than five years old forthwith.’ However, this remedy would not be enforceable if it impeded the defendants form complying with the pending FOIA requests.”).
83. Id. at ¶ 54.
84. See Fraternal Order of Police v. City of Chicago, 59 N.E.3d 96, 99 (Ill.
App. 1st Dist. 2016) (explaining that the issues presented are that “defendants
the City of Chicago (City) and the Chicago Police Department (CPD) argue that
the circuit court erred in granting preliminary injunctions . . . [to] enjoin defendants from releasing certain information contained in records generated by
police oversight agencies’ investigations of citizen complaints of alleged police
misconduct.”).
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autonomy should be upheld and may even be sacrosanct.85 This
notice could take the form of an email, a certified letter or a public posting that indicates injured citizens have an initial right to
draft and characterize their own complaints about any officer.
This Article acknowledges that any such notice may prove
ineffective since some officers simply cannot accept the truth.
The truth is that the injured citizen and/or general public are
sole owners of police complaints.86 Such owners are entitled to
draft, characterize, and see what happens to their own complaints.
III. NORMATIVE ANALYSIS
To review, police complaints have the potential to reduce
bad police work and unnecessary litigation. Their potential, however, has been undermined by a limitation on how claims are
framed. This limitation requires that every allegation be framed,
as part of any valid police complaint, exclusively under certain
legal theories (i.e. administrative law theories). By implication,
there is no option for them to be framed in other terms under the
adjudicative process that is used to resolve police complaints in
Chicago (i.e. civil law theories, or criminal law theories, which
regulators should be made aware of).
Such an unjustified limitation on complainant autonomy
has distributional effects upon the parties to a police complaint,
since each real party in interest-injured citizen is being involuntarily-deprived of the legal right to draft and characterize their
own claims by the nominal plaintiff-CPD. The goal is to protect
the pre-filing interests of defendant-officers. Such protections affect the traditional relationship between the parties to a police
complaint and prevent defendant-officers from being held fullyaccountable by real parties in interest-injured citizens for any
wrongdoing that is not covered by the nominal plaintiff-CPD’s
administrative rules. This unjustified impairment, which takes
the form of a reduction in a real party in interest-injured party’s
ability to draft and characterize their own misconduct allegations, may be grounded in a mistaken belief about who owns police complaints.
85. See generally Keeley & Sons, Inc. v. Zurich American Ins. Co., 947
N.E.2d 876, 884 (Ill. App. 5th Dist. 2011) (finding that Illinois courts “must respect the traditional notion that the plaintiff is the master of his complaint,
thereby free to choose his own theory of liability so long as the evidence supports
it.”).
86. See Emmanuel, supra note 15.

134

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW HEADNOTES [103:114

Currently, defendant-officers are believed to have acquired
a property interest in police complaints because of their signing
of a collective bargaining agreement with the nominal plaintiffCPD. This mistaken belief cannot be considered reasonable, as
indicated by recent cases at the federal and state-level, even if
such a transfer of property rights is the subject-matter of an otherwise-valid common law contract. It, therefore, stands to reason
that the nominal plaintiff-CPD should allow real parties in interest-injured citizens to frame their allegations under all the
available options: since defendant-officers may not have any prefiling interests that need to be protected.
Thus if the CPD wants to realize the multiple benefits that
arise from restoring the traditional distribution of rights between the parties, which could take the form of dignitary, informational and efficiency gains, one follow-up question is “whether
different protections must be offered, so as to achieve this
goal?”87 This department is likely to answer in the affirmative,
especially if it draws on recent scholarship in local government
law.88 The best of this work argues that the CPD should offer
different protections,89 although much of this literature does not
offer guidance for doing so.90 This lack of guidance, especially
with respect to what is meant by different, which could mean
better or additional, leads to confusion about what administrative reforms should be undertaken under the adjudicative process that is used to resolve complaints.91
Therefore, in order to provide a measure of guidance to the
CPD and other U.S. law enforcement agencies that purport to
give officers a property interest in public goods and services, this
87. See, e.g., Aditi Bagchi, Other People’s Contracts, 32 YALE J. ON. REG.
211, 212 (2015) (describing an “interpretive rule that would better protect third
party losers in contract: textual ambiguity should be resolved to avoid compromising the legally-recognized interests of third-parties.”).
88. See, e.g., Randall K. Johnson, Why We Need a Comprehensive Recording
Fraud Registry, 2014 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y QUORUM 88 (2014) (explaining that U.S. administrative agencies that provide citizens with greater access
to public information are better at detecting, and deterring, public employee
misconduct in various ways.”).
89. See generally Moran, supra note 18, at 39 (“I propose three remedies
that . . . address different aspects of the [problem].”).
90. See, e.g., Andrew S. Baer, Dignity Restoration and the Chicago Police
Torture Reparations Ordinance, 92 CHI. KENT L. REV. 593 (2017) (finding that
“social movements can facilitate dignity restoration, but these efforts work best
in tandem with other provisions [that are not fully-described in the article].”).
91. Cf. Randall K. Johnson, How the United States Postal Service (USPS)
Could Encourage More Local Economic Development, 92 CHI. KENT L. REV. 593,
598 (2017) (describing similar problems with USPS reform efforts).
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Part III describes ways to better protect complainant autonomy.92 It does so, specifically, by accounting for previously-ignored issues such as conflicts of interest, behavioral economic
biases and path dependency. The goal is to limit externalities, as
well as any other existing market failures, so that the CPD may
better account for the cost of bad police work.
Within this context, there may be several ways to better protect complainant autonomy under the adjudicative process that
is used to resolve police complaints: regardless of whether such
a right is clearly-established or not.93 For example, the CPD
could explain to its officers that “citizens are the owners of government and . . . public officials owe a fiduciary duty to act in . . .
[the general public’s] . . . best interest.”94 As such, it would be a
breach of duty for a mere agent (the nominal plaintiff-CPD or
defendant-officers) to impair the rights of its principal (the general public, whose interested are represented by a real party in
interest-injured citizen).95 Better protecting complainant autonomy, therefore, helps to avoid future rights violations and litigation due to dignitary gains: especially by real parties in interestinjured citizens and the general public.
Another reform option is for the nominal plaintiff-CPD to
assure that defendant-officers learn from police complaints that
are made by real parties in interest-injured citizens.96 The nominal plaintiff-CPD may do so by running the numbers on police
complaints about defendant-officers and finding out what types
92. See Bishop, supra note 39 (explaining, implicitly, that a low-cost designation could arise from “reaching economic decisions by comparing the costs of
doing something with its benefits (cost-benefit analysis).”).
93. Other U.S. jurisdictions, such as the State of New Jersey, acknowledge
the existence of various related rights and protect them against unjustified impairments. See generally Sally Herships, Update: NJ Police Complaint System
Broken, WNYC NEWS (Feb. 12, 2013), https://www.wnyc.org/story/269147-2-njpolice-complaint
-system-broken/ (“The rules for filing complaints against police in New Jersey
are what they should be, according to Alex Shalom, a lawyer and investigator
with the ACLU. Citizens can file . . . by phone, anonymously, or even through a
third-party.”).
94. Hoffman, supra note 69, at 49 (2017).
95. See Emmanuel, supra note 15 (explaining that a “union recently halted
a city effort to grant requests for police misconduct records dating back to the
1960s, arguing that the city violated . . . [a CPD-police] . . . union agreement.”).
96. See Rob Arthur, How To Predict Bad Cops In Chicago, FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (Dec. 15, 2015), https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/how-to-predict
-which-chicago-cops-will-commit-misconduct/ (explaining that “a data-driven
mechanism to reduce police misconduct would be extremely valuable to the Chicago Police Department and the City of Chicago.”).
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of actions, or inactions, cause police complaints to be filed in the
first place.97 Such an approach also could help police tortfeasors
to learn from their errors, which may translate into informational gains for the nominal plaintiff-CPD and defendant-officers.
Lastly, the nominal plaintiff-CPD could move away from
having defendant-officers deal with complaint intake at all.98 It
may do so, at little-to-no-cost, by turning over these data-collection responsibilities to U.S. law schools, other legal service providers and state agencies such as the Illinois Criminal Justice
Information Authority.99 Using law schools to do all initial intake
work may prove to be a particularly-inspired choice, especially if
the Albany Law School serves as the model for how to draft and
characterize police complaints.100 Potential benefits include efficiency gains by real parties in interest-injured citizens, the nominal plaintiff-CPD and even some of the defendant-officers.101

97. See Emmanuel, supra note 15 (“[Former Chicago] Ald. Will Burns (4th)
. . . said . . . that the [current CPD-police union] contract should be reviewed to
allow authorities to suspend or fire cops with too many complaints as well as
officers subject to excessive force lawsuits settled by the city”).
98. Compare Mock, supra note 37 (explaining that the “requirement to
meet personally with a government agent . . . [have that agent draft and characterize the police complaint] . . . and sign an affidavit is not applied across
other Chicago government agencies.”) with Rachel Moran, Ending the Internal
Affairs Farce, 66 BUFF. L. REV. 837, 854 (2017) (finding that “allowing officers
within the same police department to investigate each other presents a variety
of problems throughout the entire complaint process, from intake to investigation to decision-making and discipline.”).
99. See Johnson, supra note 50, at 5 (“Fortunately, each of these data-collection issues may be overcome by employing solutions that are grounded in
practice. Several examples may be found in legal clinics, especially when law
students are used to collect . . . third-party data . . . [about police misconduct].”).
One potential distribution of authority would allow law school clinics to do police
complaint intake, other legal service providers to track complaints after their
submission and for state agencies to analyze how these complaints are resolved.
100. See Albany Citizen’s Police Review Board, ALBANY LAW SCHOOL, http://
www.albanylaw.edu/centers/government-law-center/citizents-police-review
-board (“In a unique arrangement, the Government Law Center of Albany Law
School provides substantial support services to assist the [Albany Citizen’s Police Review] Board in its duties and responsibilities.”) (last visited Feb. 16,
2019).
101. Studies suggest that police misconduct may arise from poor educational
attainment, as opposed to merely poor training and oversight, since college-educated officers have fewer issues than others. See generally John L. Hudgins,
Require College Degrees For Police, BALTIMORE SUN (Sep. 30, 2014),
http://www.baltimoresun
.com/news/opinion/oped/bs-ed-police-degrees-20140930-story,amp.html (“Numerous studies conducted since the 1970s have suggested that the benefits of
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But, as this author anticipated in a 2013 article, such reform
efforts may be limited when:
[The nominal plaintiff-CPD does not] avoid situations that distort
third-party data. For example, third-party data may be less accurate
when regulators and [defendant-] officers share office space. It also
may have limited usefulness when data collection is not done in a
timely manner or employs substandard procedures. Lastly, third-party
data may be less effective when there are costly barriers to [real parties
in interest-injured citizens raising claims with the nominal plaintiff
CPD].102

If these problems could be overcome, at least with respect to
the police complaint intake process in Chicago, then the nominal
plaintiff-CPD may restore the traditional distribution of legal
rights. This distribution accepts that each real party in interestinjured citizen has the initial right to draft and characterize any
police misconduct allegations that are made about the defendant-officers. This traditional distribution of rights has been
acknowledged, and fully-upheld, in numerous contexts within
the U.S. legal system. These contexts include administrative,
civil and criminal proceedings, which each acknowledge that injured parties are the masters of their own complaint.103 An example of a case in point is Keeley & Sons, Inc. v. Zurich American
Ins. Co. 104
CONCLUSION
In closing, since the nominal plaintiff-CPD purports to have
the ability to properly-sort police misconduct allegations under
the scaled-down process that is used to resolve these types of administrative complaints, this Article takes the agency at its word
and defers to CPD expertise. This Article, thus, does not seek to
challenge the nominal plaintiff-CPD’s right to place jurisdictional limits upon its own adjudicative processes. Nor does it assume, in cases where complainant autonomy is not fully-protected in administrative settings, that a real party in interest-

higher education in policing include: better behavioral and performance characteristics, fewer on-the-job injuries and assaults; fewer disciplinary actions from
accidents and use of force allegations, greater acceptance of minorities and a
decrease in dogmatism, authoritarianism, rigidity and conservatism.”).
102. Johnson, supra note 50, at 4.
103. See generally 409 Ill. App. 3d 515 (5th Dist. 2011) (finding that Illinois
courts “must respect the traditional notion that the plaintiff is the master of his
complaint, thereby free to choose his own theory of liability so long as the evidence supports it.”).
104. Id.
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injured citizen has no other way to hold defendant-officers to account. The Article, merely, questions the wisdom of the nominal
plaintiff-CPD’s decision to limit the type, quality and quantity of
information that may be added to the public record by a real
party in interest-injured citizen through their police complaints.
Among the benefits of allowing real parties in interest-injured citizens to describe the full range of harms that have been
imposed upon them by defendant-officers is that the nominal
plaintiff-CPD may be put on notice about the high cost of any
bad police work. As such, this Article argues that complainant
autonomy should be fully-protected because it has the potential
to limit any such cost, regardless of whether this right is clearlyestablished or not. One reason is the nominal plaintiff-CPD may
no longer claim to be unaware of misconduct by defendant-officers, at least once a real party in interest-injured citizen has the
ability to add previously-ignored information to the administrative record. Adding such information helps to assure that each
real party in interest-injured citizen, just like all defendant-officers and the nominal plaintiff-CPD, has a chance to shape the
record.
In laying out its argument, which focuses upon the police
complaint intake process in Chicago, the Article also identifies a
novel approach to CPD reform. It does this work by letting defendant-officers know what is legally-required of them, removing
any ability for police to limit the legal claims that are raised by
real parties in interest-injured citizens and using all relevant
and probative information to inform the administrative work of
the nominal plaintiff-CPD. These reforms help to overcome a
range of issues, such as conflicts of interest, behavioral economic
biases or path dependency, which arise from the nominal plaintiff-CPD’s complaint intake process.
The Article, lastly, explains why such reforms may be costeffective. There are, at least, three reasons why. First, these reforms reduce transaction costs.105 These reforms also produce
fewer opportunity costs, which is the idea that the “true cost of
something is what you give up to get it.”106 Lastly, each provides
a potentially low-cost way to better protect complainant autonomy.

105. Bishop, supra note 39.
106. Id.

